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“It’s a great place for kids!”:
the settlement of Ma’ale Adumim  
as a suburban safe space 
Marco Allegra 
The status of Jerusalem is almost universally regarded as the single most divisive 
issue in Israeli-Palestinian relations; and Israel’s settlement policy – and its terri-
torial and demographic implications – is widely considered as the most significant 
“fact on the ground” established by Israel since 1967. We address these issues by 
observing how Israel’s settlement policy in the area of metropolitan Jerusalem 
transformed the material, symbolic and political landscape of Israeli-Palestinian 
relations. Through the case study of the settlement of Ma’ale Adumim, this paper 
focuses on settlers’ place attachment, personal geographies, and the relation 
between the latter and the production of space. We maintain that the “suburban 
experience” embodied in the lives of the residents illustrates the action of power-
ful drivers of the overall process of normalization of Jewish presence in the West 
Bank; in turn, this rendered the settlement policy relatively uncontroversial for 
large sectors of Israeli public opinion. Also, we maintain that settlements such 
as Ma’ale Adumim are also the product of the quest for a suburban “safe space” 
– i. e. an enclosed space designed to avoid contacts with “unpleasant otherness” 
that residents of the suburbs all over the world often associate to life in the inner 
city. 
KEYWORDS: Jerusalem, Israeli settlements, Israeli-Palestinian conflict, West Bank, 
suburbs. 
“É um sítio ideal para as crianças!” O colonato de Ma’ale Adumim como 
espaço suburbano seguro  O estatuto de Jerusalém é quase universalmente 
considerado a questão mais fraturante nas relações israelo-palestinianas; a política 
dos colonatos de Israel – e suas implicações territoriais e demográficas – é ampla-
mente considerada como o “fact on the ground” mais significativo estabelecido por 
Israel desde 1967. Através do exame do estudo de caso do Ma’ale Adumim, abor-
daremos estas questões observando como a política dos colonatos na área metro-
politana de Jerusalém transformou a paisagem material, simbólica e política das 
relações israelo-palestinianas. O artigo tratará as geografias pessoais dos colonos e a 
relação entre estas e a produção do espaço. A “experiência suburbana” da vida dos 
colonos permite-nos compreender os principais fatores do processo de normaliza-
ção da presença judaica na Cisjordânia; ao mesmo tempo, este fenómeno tornou 
a política de fixação relativamente incontroversa para grandes sectores da opinião 
pública em Israel. Além disso, afirmamos que colonatos como Ma’ale Adumim 
também são o produto da busca de um “espaço (suburbano) seguro”– ou seja, um 
espaço fechado onde os residentes podem evitar contactos com “alteridades desa-
gradáveis”, associados à vida na inner city de Jerusalém. 
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ISRAEL’S SETTLEMENT POLICY AND ITS WIDE-RANGING IMPLICATIONS 
have been subject to intense debate for decades. Their development has repre-
sented a source of friction between Israelis and Palestinians and has substan-
tially changed the human geography of the West Bank. Conventional wisdom 
(and, to a certain extent, the scholarly literature on the subject), however, is 
often misleading; indeed, settlers are usually depicted as committed activists 
or messianic fanatics who have moved to the West Bank for religious or ideo-
logical reasons – and, ultimately, to redeem the land and claim it for Zionism 
and the Jewish people. 
Still, this conventional wisdom – which is visually represented by the image 
of groups of bearded, armed settlers patrolling the hills of the West Bank – 
hardly represents an accurate account of the reality of the settlements, and 
cannot fully explain the dynamics of their proliferation. As I have argued else-
where (Allegra, Handel and Maggor 2017), the development of Israel’s settle-
ment policy can be understood only if we view it against the background of 
broader historical, political and socioeconomic trends that have defined Isra-
el’s and the region’s history. This article, in particular, focuses on the relatively 
under-researched reality of suburban settlements (i. e. of large, non-ideological 
communities located at commuting distance from Israel’s main urban centres) 
and, specifically, on the settlement of Ma’ale Adumim. 
My argument is twofold. In the first place, I argue that the relative suc-
cess of Israel’s settlement policy, to a significant extent, is due to – and can 
be measured by – the banalization of Jewish presence in the West Bank. In 
other words, settlements have proliferated largely because ordinary Israelis 
can live perfectly ordinary lives in their communities; in turn, the banality of 
life in the settlements have greatly eased the incorporation of the West Bank 
into Israel’s socioeconomic fabric. In the second place, I argue that the set-
tlements are part and parcel of ongoing dynamics of socio-spatial segregation 
that are not exclusively premised on the Jews-Palestinians dichotomy, but 
concern the Israeli-Jewish society as well; in particular, suburban settlements 
like Ma’ale Adumim represent the perfect destinations for Israeli Jews that 
are looking for a suburban “safe space,” an enclosed space designed to avoid 
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contacts with “unpleased otherness” that residents associate to life in the 
inner city. 
This article is based on a project of investigation on Israel’s settlement 
policy, whose main focus has been the town of Ma’ale Adumim, a commu-
nity of some 40,000 residents located in the eastern periphery of Jerusalem, 
and which has resulted in several publications (Allegra, 2013, 2014, 2016; 
Rokem and Allegra, 2016; Allegra, Handel and Maggor 2017). While not an 
ethnography by any standard, my research in Ma’ale Adumim involved several 
field visits over various years and aimed at building a comprehensive profile of 
the settlements encompassing history, planning and architectural issues, polit-
ico-strategic controversies and the daily life of residents. This article is mainly 
based on the interviews I conducted with some of the residents of the com-
munity (the names given in the text are fictitious). The first section presents 
some background information on the settlements. The second section intro-
duces the main arguments of the article through the idea of “banality of colo-
nization” – i. e. the idea that the settlements have proliferated largely because 
they are in many ways indistinguishable from other localities in Israel. The 
third section introduces the case study of Ma’ale Adumim as representative of 
the largely overlooked category of “suburban settlements.” The fourth, larger 
section presents the empirical material on Ma’ale Adumim and argues that, in 
order to understand the proliferation of settlements, we need to consider them 
not only through the Israeli-Palestinian dichotomy, but also as “safe spaces” 
which offer their residents a suburban lifestyle and distance themselves from 
the negative externalities associated to life in the inner city. The last section 
offers some brief conclusive remarks. 
THE SETTLEMENTS 
Before going further, some terminological clarifications and background infor-
mation are in order. The word “settlements” indicates here the 270-280 Jewish 
communities established by Israel in the West Bank and in the Golan Heights 
(and in Gaza, before their complete evacuation in 2005) after the 1967 Arab- 
-Israeli war, irrespectively of their status in Israel’s administrative system and 
international law; this definition includes what is commonly known as “East 
Jerusalem,” an area of some 70 square kilometres that contains the medieval 
Old City of Jerusalem and constitutes the only part of the West Bank that has 
been formally annexed by Israel. Wherever used to identify specific territories, 
the terms “Israel” (or “Israel proper”) and “West Bank” will refer to the pre-
1967 armistice lines between Israel and its neighbours – meaning that the West 
Bank, in the definition used here, includes East Jerusalem. The term “Israel/
Palestine” will refer to the whole area that is presently under Israeli control, 
which includes Israel proper, the West Bank, Gaza and the Golan Heights. 
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Settlements, which considerably vary in nature and scale (from urban cen-
tres counting tens of thousands of residents, to single-building settlements), 
host today more than 600,000 residents (of which some two hundred thousand 
Jewish residents of East Jerusalem) out of a total Israeli population of some 
eight million (Allegra 2016). Major population centres (with a population of 
10,000 residents or more) are the “new neighbourhoods” established in East 
Jerusalem (Gilo, Ramot Allon, Neve Ya’akov, Pisgat Ze’ev, Har Homa, Ramat 
Shlomo, and East Talpiot) and a few large communities in the West Bank 
(Modi’in Illit, Beitar Illit, Ma’ale Adumim, Ariel, and Giv’at Ze’ev), whose 
combined population amounted to 330,000 residents in 2011; at the same 
date, nine other settlements in the West Bank (Efrat, French Hill, Kiryat Arba, 
Alfei Menashe, Ramat Eshkol, Oranit, Karnei Shomron, Kochav Ya’akov, and 
Beit El) had a population between 5,000 and 10,000 units (B’Tselem 2018). 
Administratively speaking, these communities are largely indistinguishable 
from other centres in Israel, although both local authorities and individual 
settlers enjoy a larger share of public funds than the Israeli average, in the 
form of tax discounts, direct government transfers, and infrastructural invest-
ments. While Israel has formally maintained the Jordanian legal system in the 
West Bank (with the abovementioned exception of East Jerusalem), it has also 
repeatedly amended Jordanian legislation through the enactment of hundreds 
of military orders. Technically, the settlements remain under the responsibility 
of Israel’s military administration, but the military orders that apply to them 
have been modelled on Israeli laws, so that as Eyal Benvenisti (1989: preface) 
pointed out, since the end of the 1980s, “the pre-June 1967 borders have 
faded for almost all legal purposes that reflect Israeli interest.” Parallel to the 
legal infrastructure, a physical infrastructure has been created over the years 
in the West Bank, which serves the settlements by connecting them to Israel’s 
transportation network and main population centres. 
Last but not least, the vast majority of settlers live in large suburban com-
munities located near the Green Line (the pre-1967 border between Israel and 
Jordan) – in particular, between two-thirds and four-fifths live in the metro-
politan area of Jerusalem, both inside the municipal boundaries of the city 
and in the so-called “settlement blocs” in its immediate periphery, namely 
the clusters around the communities of Ma’ale Adumim, Modi’in Illit, Giv’at 
Ze’ev, and the Gush Etzion (see Allegra 2016). These settlements, along with 
the Ariel bloc in the northern part of the West Bank, are often referred to as 
being inhabited by “quality-of-life settlers,” Israelis that have moved to the 
West Bank in search of affordable housing, economic benefits, and, ultimately, 
upward social mobility. 
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THE BANALITY OF OCCUPATION 
The mention of “quality-of-life settlers” introduces my first broad argu-
ment about Israel’s settlement policy: while most scholarly contributions 
have focused almost exclusively on the ideological and strategic drivers of 
the expansion of the settlements, I argue that settlements have proliferated 
largely because of the fact that they are relatively normal communities to live 
in, which are in many ways indistinguishable from other localities in Israel; 
in other words, that Israel’s settlement policy has been successful precisely 
because of the relatively banal and mundane factors underlying it, which 
has in turn allowed for the entrenchment of Israeli control over the West 
Bank and the dramatic transformation of the landscape of Israel/Palestine as 
a whole. 
In making this argument, I am certainly not implying that strategic and 
ideological concerns have not been important in the development of Israel’s 
settlement policy; rather, I am suggesting that we should be sceptical of the 
kind of single-factor explanations that often underlie the studies that focus on 
the role of the settlers’ movement and of its symbiosis with the Israeli state. 
The idea of “banality of the occupation” invites us to think about the settle-
ments in a more holistic manner: the normalization of the settlements was not 
produced by one specific agent motivated by ideological concerns, but rather 
by pluralistic coalitions whose participants (politicians and activists, planners 
and bureaucrats, businessmen and settler-consumers) did not necessarily par-
take a common ideology, and were acting against the background of larger 
processes and trends which developed within the Israeli society (demographic 
and economic cycles, dynamics of welfare retrenchment, the changing political 
economy of industry and employment, and so forth). 
The literature on Israel’s settlement policy has often assumed the his-
tory of national-religious Gush Emunim (the “Bloc of the Faithful,” a move-
ment founded in 1973 that conducted aggressive political campaigns for the 
“redemption” of the land) as a paradigm of the settlement policy as a whole 
(Feige 2009); indeed, the scholarly study of the settlements has been by and 
large the study of the organization, the political culture and the agency of 
the Gush Emunim and its likes (Newman 1985; Lustick 1988; Aran 1991; 
Sprinzak 1991; Friedman 1992). Many studies in the last decade or so (Peled 
and Shafir 2002; Gorenberg 2006; Eldar and Zertal 2007; Ranta 2009) have 
explicitly or implicitly criticized the previous literature for its excessive empha-
sis on the role of the national-religious movement, which, as Yehuda Shen-
hav argued, has framed the proliferation of the settlements as a “spontaneous 
and random undertaking by eccentrics” (Shenhav 2012: 31), and as a pro-
cess in which the Israeli state has been drawn against its will or best inter-
est. These contributions have emphasized the role of the state in developing 
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and  supporting the expansion of the settlements; however, they have hardly 
challenged the prevailing consensus on the role of the settlers’ movement, or 
explored lines of enquiry that did not focus on the strategic and ethnonational 
imperatives behind the establishment of the settlements. 
It is not by chance that, throughout this literature, the foundation of the 
first Gush Emunim settlements (and in particular of the “capital” of the move-
ment, the community of Ofra) has assumed a paradigmatic value. As the Israeli 
journalist Ari Shavit tells us in his bestseller, My Promised Land: The Triumph 
and Tragedy of Israel,
“The nightmare we [the members of Peace Now during the 1980s] envi-
sioned turned into reality. That is why some thirty years later, I am driving 
to Ofra – the mother of all settlements – not to fight it, but to understand it. To 
understand how the settlements turned from rightist fantasy to historical 
fact” (Shavit 2013: 203, our emphasis). 
For Shavit and many others, understanding the settlements means under-
standing Ofra; I would argue instead that Ma’ale Adumim offers a better case 
study in this respect. 
In the first place, Ofra was not the “mother of all settlements.” Not only 
at the time of Ofra’s foundation several other settlements had already been 
established but, more importantly, it would be difficult to understand the vari-
ety of settlement patterns (in terms of genesis, location, socioeconomic fabric, 
and so forth) and explain the overall development of Israel’s settlement policy 
by looking to Ofra – a community established in a relatively peripheral loca-
tion of the West Bank and inhabited by some 3,000 residents, most of which 
share the national-religious ideology of the Gush Emunim. As we have noted, 
most of the settlers’ population is constituted, rather than by settlers-activists, 
by settlers-commuters that live in large, fully-serviced communities located 
near the main Israeli employment centres. 
In the second place, the reference to Ofra reflects the overemphasis on the 
agency of the Gush Emunim. Settlements are not a “rightist fantasy” that the 
settlers’ movement has imposed on the otherwise sane and rational body of 
the Israeli nation. Indeed, many recent contributions have pointed out how 
the settlers have always enjoyed the support of powerful allies in the Israeli 
establishment, both on the right and the left (Gorenberg 2006; Eldar and 
Zertal 2007; Ranta 2009, 2015), and that the Gush Emunim itself has been 
successful, to a large extent, because it was able to latch on to some key trends 
developing in the Israeli society of the 1970s (Newman 2017). The success of 
the settlements depended on the convergence of different interests and ratio-
nalities, and, in a more operative sense, on the formation of broad coalitions 
of actors in support of a given project. 
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In the third place, assuming Ofra, home to the aristocracy of the nation-
al-religious movement, as paradigm of Israel’s settlement policy tends to cor-
roborate the idea that the settlements are an enclosed community of religious 
fundamentalists, existing beyond the administrative, cultural and socio-politi-
cal borders of Israel proper – for a critical assessment of this view, see Dalsheim 
and Harel (2009). As Adam LeBor has put it, 
“[t]here are two Israels: one inside the Green Line, the 1967 border, 
the other an occupying power extending beyond it. The first is a vibrant 
democracy, with Arab members of Parliament, university professors and 
lawyers, beauty queens and soldiers, and even a Muslim cabinet minister 
[…] Across the Green Line, the West Bank, captured in 1967, is another 
country, neither Israel nor Palestine, but a lawless place, where the Jewish 
settler, rifle in one hand and prayer book in the other, is undisputed king” 
(LeBor 2007). 
Against this stereotyped image of the settler-activist (and the continued 
reliance on the Green Line as a meaningful territorial artefact), several recent 
studies have pointed out how the population of the settlements tends to mir-
ror Israel’s social and cultural diversity. Needless to say, a substantial part of 
Israel’s political, administrative, economic and cultural institutions are located 
“across the Green Line,” including half of the country’s capital and several 
bodies of local government, hundreds of schools and one of the nine Israeli 
universities, touristic sites and industrial areas, and so forth. The settlers’ 
population includes religious and secular communities, recent immigrants 
and veteran Israelis, and a wide range of socioeconomic groups (Dalsheim 
2008; Weiss 2011; Cahaner and Shilhav 2013; Cahaner 2017). As a matter 
of fact, about a third of the settlers are today members of the ultraorthodox 
community of the haredim, which has never completely accepted the legiti-
macy of Zionism but nevertheless gladly reaped the opportunities that the 
settlement enterprise offers to a demographically exuberant but nonetheless 
very poor community. 
MA’ALE ADUMIM AND THE SUBURBANIZATION
OF ISRAEL’S SETTLEMENT POLICY 
In other words, should we have to pick a single case study to investigate Isra-
el’s settlement policy, Ma’ale Adumim would serve us much better than Ofra. 
First, Ma’ale Adumim is in many ways a paradigmatic example of how a large 
part of the settlements have benefited from their condition of “double central-
ity” (Newman 1996, 2017) of suburban settlements in Israel territorial devel-
opment policies: Ma’ale Adumim is located at less than 10 kilometres from the 
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Old City of Jerusalem, in an area that is within the economic and geographic 
centre of the country; at the same time, land prices in the West Bank have 
been kept at an artificially low level by the government, which has also gener-
ously subsidized individuals and companies with financial and fiscal benefits. 
Large part of the town’s 40,000 current residents has moved beyond the Green 
Line attracted by these benefits, by the high quality of municipal services and 
by the possibility of commuting to the country’s main employment centres. 
For most residents – and especially for relatively weak and marginalized sec-
tors of Israel’s Jewish population, such as second-generation Mizrahi in the 
1980s, and immigrants from the former Soviet Union in the 1990s – moving 
to Ma’ale Adumim has been part of a pattern of upward social mobility which 
has allowed them to join Israel’s middle class. 
Second, Ma’ale Adumim is commonly considered as a “consensus settle-
ment,” a settlement whose existence is widely regarded as non-controversial 
by the Israeli public. Since the aftermath of the 1967 war, the idea of building 
a settlement in the area of Ma’ale Adumim enjoyed the support of a wide and 
diverse coalition of actors. Before the first nucleus of the settlement was estab-
lished in the form of a small “workers camp” attached to the industrial area of 
Mishor Adumim, the Gush Emunim leaders involved in the operation acted 
essentially as mediators between partisan and non-partisan settlers groups, 
and key members of the Israeli establishment of the time (Allegra and Handel 
2017). A few years later, when the plans for the new town were put forward, 
it became clear that every sector or group in the Israeli society (apart from 
the marginal fringe voicing a radical, ideological opposition to the settlements 
policy) could argue in favour of Ma’ale Adumim: politicians and activists obvi-
ously saluted the establishment of a large, fast-growing Jewish community in 
the periphery of Jerusalem as an appropriate answer to the territorial and 
demographic challenges inherent to Israel’s control on the city; planners and 
bureaucrats saw it as a rational way to steer urban development and allocate 
efficiently financial and territorial resources in the face of a growing demo-
graphic pressure on the city of Jerusalem; businessmen, developers and real 
estate agents immediately saw the opportunity for making handsome profits 
from the construction of 10,000 housing units in a prime real estate area; and, 
of course, hundreds of families of Jerusalemites who could not afford living in 
the city rushed to buy new, modern apartments and villas that were on offer at 
a bargain price (Allegra 2013, 2016). As Thomas Leitersdorf, the head of the 
Ma’ale Adumim planning team, noted: 
“[Ma’ale Adumim] was a success story and every apartment that went 
on the market was instantly grabbed. So the politicians said, ‘Ok, the popu-
lation in Judea and Samaria is growing, we have no marketing problems and 
we don’t have to pay huge subsidies to support mobile homes on various 
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hills’ […]. I would say that the glory of that time was that the planning and 
political considerations went hand in hand” (quoted in Tamir-Tawil 2003: 
155-156). 
Third, Ma’ale Adumim shows the profound connection existing between 
most of the settlements and the social, economic and territorial fabric of 
Israel. A bedroom community sitting in the eastern periphery of Jerusalem, 
Ma’ale Adumim is in many ways antithetic to the Wild West that LeBor 
describes in the West Bank. From the immediate aftermath of the 1967 war, 
Ma’ale Adumim was considered as a part of the functional area of Jerusalem: 
it is worth remembering, in this respect, that the first development in the area 
was not a settlement but rather the industrial park of Mishor Adumim – i. e. 
an infrastructure designed to cater for a much wider public than the Jewish 
residents of the West Bank or even Jerusalem. Ma’ale Adumim was therefore 
planned as a node of a wider metropolitan network centred on Jerusalem, 
and marketed as a suburb of Jerusalem which offered all the advantages tra-
ditionally associated to suburban localities vis à vis the inner city: the latter 
is defined by overcrowding and chaos, unsustainably high level of real estate 
prices, poor services, crime and pollution, deteriorating housing stock, and 
the residents’ anonymity; on the contrary, suburbs offer “order/efficiency, 
daily exposure to nature’s beauty and goodness, use of technology to improve 
the residents’ quality of life, aesthetic quality, and the values of individuality, 
family and community” (Modarres and Kirby 2010: 116). Sarah, who works 
at the local community centre (the matnas), succinctly captures this set of 
characteristics when she notes that Ma’ale Adumim “is a great place for kids!” 
[Sarah, interview] – at the same time indicating the main audience for the 
city in terms of prospective residents, that is, young couples with children 
looking for a cheap and secure place to leave at commuting distance from 
Jerusalem. 
The characteristics that set Ma’ale Adumim apart from Ofra and distance it 
from the stereotypical image of settlements are clearly visible in the experience 
of the residents. The way Miriam, a retired teacher, recalls her experience as 
one of the earliest residents of the town is the antithesis of the paradigmatic 
image of the Zionist pioneer: 
“I didn’t want to come here… When I came here… there was only the 
desert, and I was awfully frightened and asked [my husband] ‘Why did you 
bring me here? This is my punishment’… When we came to the lottery 
[organized to assign the plots]… there were 53 plots in the lottery… I was 
so happy: number 50, is not us, number 51 is not us, number 52: it was us… 
I said ‘my God!’, it was my birthday and the most beautiful gift would have 
been not to win the lottery” [Miriam, interview]. 
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Soon, with the rapid development of the new town, Ma’ale Adumim 
assumed a very different physiognomy, but the attitude of prospective resi-
dents did not change; as a later resident puts it, moving to the town 
“was a pretty random kind of decision… We moved here because it was 
close and convenient and the rent was affordable at the time… We went to a 
real estate agent, he took us I think… he took us to Gilo [another settlement 
in the area of Jerusalem, NdA], I think he took us to some place in Jerusa-
lem which I’ve forgotten… It was a question of the rent, and one guy wanted 
us to pay every three months, one guy wanted us to pay every month. It was 
a very random” [Daniel, interview]. 
Rather than idealistic pioneers, the residents of Ma’ale Adumim are 
white-collar commuters – or, as a real estate ad in the 1980s defined the town’s 
target population, “lovers of Jerusalem” (Thorpe 1984: 119). As Rachel, a gym 
instructor at the Ma’ale Adumim community centre, remembers, 
“[w]e wanted to live close to Jerusalem but not in Jerusalem… I’m a 
city girl, I grew up in London, I can’t live in the middle of nowhere… so we 
settled in Ma’ale Adumim… it’s cheaper [than Jerusalem]… you have the 
luxury to have a community feeling” [Rachel, interview]. 
The symbiosis between the suburb and the inner city is so deep that one 
cannot tell exactly where the former ends and the latter begins – despite the 
existence of a neat physical gap between the two. Here is what Abigail has to 
say about her experience as a teenager resident:
“If somebody asks me where I’m from, I’d say Jerusalem, I won’t say 
Ma’ale Adumim. I could say Ma’ale Adumim, it happens, Ma’ale Adumim 
or Jerusalem it’s like the same to me… For instance: everything is in Jerusa-
lem… if you want to go shopping with your parents, you go to Jerusalem… 
Your parents went to work every day; I went to scouts in Jerusalem… So we 
came [to Jerusalem] a lot. We went out, we went out in Jerusalem” [Abigail, 
interview]. 
A SUBURBAN SAFE SPACE 
The banal and mundane character of Jewish life in the settlements did not 
create a homogeneous space, uniformly extending “Israel” into the West Bank. 
It rather contributed to thoroughly reformulate the socio-spatial relations 
between places and communities in Israel/Palestine – including processes of 
differentiation and even segregation within the Israeli-Jewish society. 
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The first meaningful cleavage emerging from my conversations with the 
residents, not surprisingly, is one that challenges the idea that “settlers” exist 
as a homogeneous category simply because they reside beyond the Green Line. 
It is precisely Ma’ale Adumim’s intimate link with Jerusalem (and, by exten-
sion, with the Israeli-Jewish mainstream of Israel proper) that marks the dif-
ference between the experience of the residents of Ma’ale Adumim and that 
of the “real settlers.” For example, for Abigail the real settlers are those who 
“go out and live on a hill, with like caravans, in the middle of nowhere. 
That’s a settler: somebody that lives in this hellhole for no reason […] [Here 
in Ma’ale Adumim] there’s none of the fanatics… There are degrees of set-
tlers, apparently [laughs]… We’re light, light settlers [laughs]” [Abigail, 
interview]. 
This distinction, which is fundamentally rooted in the differences in terms 
of lifestyle, came up again and again in my conversations with the residents, 
and hardly related to the latter’s political background. Daniel (in his own 
words, an “extreme-right-wing person”) spells out his ideological frustration 
with life in Ma’ale Adumim: 
“I feel in many ways ideologically unaccomplished by living in Ma’ale 
Adumim. If I talk to people from outside Israel, they may see me as a set-
tler… but you probably know already enough about the situation to under-
stand that… it’s a kind of a phony settler situation. I am not really a settler 
in that sense” [Daniel, interview]. 
Sarah, whose political ideas are opposite to Daniel’s, seems to concur as 
she declares: 
“I don’t consider myself a settler, I feel I just live in the suburbs… To 
me lines are invisible… I don’t consider myself a settler, I joke around a lot 
with Rebecca [another resident of Ma’ale Adumim who works for the Israeli 
nongovernmental organization Rabbis for Human Rights], I say ‘you know, 
we are settlers for human rights’ ” [Sarah, interview]. 
The features of Israel’s settlement policy that we can recognize in Ma’ale 
Adumim, however, do not simply create different classes of settlers, but rather 
are part and parcel of broader patterns of change in the Israeli society. As Lee 
Cahaner (2017) points out in her study of the ultraorthodox settlers, for exam-
ple, the creation of large haredi settlements such as Modi’in Illit and Beitar 
Illit has had far-reaching consequences for the ultraorthodox community. The 
political orientation of these communities has changed, as the haredim have 
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gradually come to embrace the settlement enterprise for a peculiar mix of reli-
gious and socio-economic motives, albeit from a particularistic point of view 
and without adhering to the ideology of mainstream political Zionism. At the 
same time, the development of large haredi new towns has partly altered the 
socio-spatial identity of a community whose members rarely ventured outside 
the traditional ultraorthodox strongholds in Jerusalem and Bnei Brak. 
Despite their traditional estrangement from Zionist political discourse, 
haredim tend to make, so to speak, excellent settlers, due to some of the fea-
tures of the ultraorthodox society. In part, this is due to structural character-
istics of the haredi population, namely its rapid demographic growth (which 
is translated into hunger for housing) and poverty (which tends to squeeze 
haredim out of prime real estate locations); in part, this is a result of haredi 
culture and, specifically, the ultraorthodox instinct for self-segregation. Indeed, 
Cahaner notes how the development of large haredi settlements, despite the 
inherent challenges this presented to the community’s socio-spatial identity, 
largely recreated in the West Bank the traditional “wall of holiness” that had 
protected the haredi way of life by minimizing the contacts with the external 
world: 
“Thanks to their internal cohesion and demographic strength – and, cru-
cially, the provision of publicly funded government services – it has rebuilt 
its ‘walls of holiness’ at metropolitan scale. This ensures the development 
of a coherent ultraorthodox space, with the traditional centres of Bnei 
Brak and Jerusalem functioning as ‘inner cities’ of a large and expanding 
ultraorthodox suburban system. Participation to the settlement enterprise 
did not open up ultraorthodox space to a more intense exchange with the 
Israeli-Jewish society as a whole, as might have been predicted; indeed, the 
‘suburban gated communities’ that have been built for the ultraorthodox set-
tlers have reinforced previous patterns of segregation” (Cahaner 2017: 124).
The same dynamic is visible in Ma’ale Adumim: while few of the residents 
would accept any comparison with their haredi compatriots, the physical, sym-
bolic and socioeconomic gates that set Ma’ale Adumim apart from its sur-
roundings constitute, to some extent, a secular version of the ultraorthodox 
“wall of holiness.” As Oren Yiftachel remarked,
“beyond the powerful impact of the settling ethnocratic culture, there 
are some influential groups that gain from the establishment of settle-
ments… [U]pwardly mobile groups who seek ‘quality of life’… often an 
euphemism for the rush of middle-class families into gated, or controlled, 
suburban localities, ‘protected’ from the proximity of ‘undesirables’ ” 
(Yiftachel 2003: 36). 
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Ma’ale Adumim is not a gated community in a strict sense. In smaller set-
tlements in the West Bank, prospective residents need to apply and pass the 
screening of local community boards; Ma’ale Adumim’s administrative status 
as a “city” implies that everyone (with the important exception of West Bank 
Palestinians, who do not have Israeli citizenship) can freely become a resident 
simply by buying a property on the market. Indeed, on the surface, Ma’ale 
Adumim – with its 40,000 residents coming from tens of different countries – 
is the poster boy of the Israeli melting pot; still, as it is the case for suburbs all 
over the world, Ma’ale Adumim is at the same time intimately connected to, 
and segregated from, its surroundings. 
In many ways, the way Ma’ale Adumim functions conforms to Yiftachel’s 
description of settlements – and it represents therefore a “safe space” in which 
residents are protected from what remains outside the gates. As we have seen, 
the community constitutes in the first place a shield against the negative exter-
nalities that are associated to the environment of the inner city – and that 
in Jerusalem in particular. Jerusalem is poor, dirty, crowded, and expensive; 
Ma’ale Adumim, on the contrary, promises prospective residents (traditionally, 
low- to middle-class young couples with children) a full package of benefits 
which include superior education for the more than 10,000 students currently 
enrolled in the local schools, tens of playgrounds and well-kept parks, effi-
cient waste collection, one of the largest community centres in the country, a 
responsive and generally beloved municipal administration – and a 24-hours 
security service at the town’s four entry gates. 
Material benefits such as infrastructure and financial incentives are com-
plemented by a more immaterial component: the quality of life that Ma’ale 
Adumim guarantees to its residents. A few years ago, the Jewish Agency (the 
Zionist, para-state organization operating, among other things, in the field of 
immigrant absorption) offered the following description of Ma’ale Adumim to 
prospective immigrants: 
“[t]he diversity and services of a city, the warmth and quiet of a small 
town […] [Ma’ale Adumim] offers a high standard of living, a rich commu-
nity life, cultural diversity and excellent schools and facilities […]. Offering 
the social diversity of the city, [Ma’ale Adumim] nonetheless maintains a 
camaraderie of neighbourhood connection, synagogue affiliation and a gen-
eral sense of community involvement” (Jewish Agency’s website).1 
This description found a constant echo in my conversation with the res-
idents, who regularly mentioned the sense of safety, care and belonging as 
1 From < http://www.jewishagency.org/JewishAgency/English/Aliyah/Absorpton+Options/Municipal 
+and+Community+Absorption/Maaleh+Adummim.htm >, last access in 2012).
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one of the key assets of this thriving community. In a contrapuntal manner, 
however, the same conversation often touched the issue of “otherness,” that 
is, the existence of groups that, in the eyes of the residents, present a potential 
challenge to the harmonious functioning of the community. 
Palestinians represent the most obvious “exotic other” in the case of Ma’ale 
Adumim. There are several distinct categories of Jewish-Palestinian encounters 
in the area of Ma’ale Aduim. First, the Palestinian town of al-Eizariya sits just 
in front of the southwestern gate of Ma’ale Adumim beyond the traffic circles. 
Traditionally, the population of Ma’ale Adumim relied on al-Eizariya for a 
number of services and commercial facilities and even crossed its centre driving 
to Jerusalem; the first and especially the second Intifada, however – along with 
the construction of the new road to Jerusalem under Mt. Scopus – brought 
these interactions to the minimum. Second, many Palestinians work in Ma’ale 
Adumim as janitors, gardeners, housekeepers, and in the construction sector. 
Third, a limited number of commercial facilities in the area (primarily the 
Rami Levy supermarket located in the industrial area, and, to a lesser extent, 
the mall of Ma’ale Adumim) are used by both communities.2 
The focus of my conversations with the residents, however, was not so 
much the actual encounters with Palestinians but rather a mental experiment 
based on the experience of the settlement of French Hill. French Hill is a 
neighbourhood in East Jerusalem where a small but growing number of Pal-
estinian families (either Israeli citizens or permanent residents of Jerusalem) 
have begun to settle in relatively recent times precisely by buying their way 
in through the local real estate market (Pullan and Yacobi 2017). I therefore 
asked my respondents how they would react to an inflow of Palestinians in 
Ma’ale Adumim – would they be surprised by learning that Palestinians live 
in Ma’ale Adumim? And how would they feel about having Palestinian neigh-
bours? Reactions ranged from mild scepticism to outright refusal to even con-
sider the possibility; the interesting thing, however, were the reasons that were 
often given to justify the residents’ attitude. To be sure, in most cases the resi-
dents’ arguments have little to do with the history of conflict that has marked 
Israeli-Palestinian relations in the West Bank in the last 60 years, and with the 
security threat that is usually associated in Israel to Palestinian presence. 
Michael, a US-born computer programmer that moved to Ma’ale Adumim 
during the 1990s, voiced his scepticism about the appropriateness of Palestin-
ian presence in Ma’ale Adumim by referring to his experience as a resident of 
New York: 
2 Some Palestinians also live in Ma’ale Adumim (I have interviewed one of them), but they are few 
in numbers, have no communal life in the city. Overall, the scale and the quality of their presence is 
completely different from cases such as Pisgat Ze’ev or French Hill – two large settlements-neighbor-
hoods in East Jerusalem, see Pullan and Yacobi (2017).
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“The ‘why’ would be a question mark… I am from New York, the big 
melting pot, but still you have Chinatown, you have Little Italy… Everyone 
has their own niche, ok? And that goes for Israel also… You have al-Eizariya 
and Ma’ale Adumim, you know… Do I see Jews living in al-Eizariya? Prob-
ably not. Do I see Arabs living in Ma’ale Adumim? Probably not… I don’t 
know what kind of Arab would want to live in Ma’ale Adumim, [since] the 
services that he personally may want may not be available for him in Ma’ale 
Adumim: schooling, religion… I know why I am here, meaning it is a nice 
Jewish community outside Jerusalem, less expensive than Jerusalem and I 
love the place. And I moved to Israel to be in a Jewish nation” [Michael, 
interview]. 
Clearly, segregation does not require open, violent conflicts to be main-
tained and even wished for; for Michael it is just part of the human nature, a 
natural pattern which is in turn reinforced by the presence/absence of infra-
structures and facilities that members of specific communities might need or 
desire. Daniel – a former Londoner who, like Michael, comes from a cosmopol-
itan urban environment – expressed a similar viewpoint rooted in his personal 
experience as an observant Jew:
“To be honest, from a social and cultural point of view, there are little 
relations between the people here and the Arabs… Why?… The truth is that 
if you would have asked me a similar question when I was living in England, 
when I was fourteen, the answer would have been pretty similar. I am a reli-
gious Jewish person, I don’t have much contact with non-Jews, I don’t even 
have much contact with non-religious Jewish people… I lived with non-Jews 
in the past: it’s not something I want but it’s not something I would fight. 
I do believe in people’s right to live where they want, as long as they behave” 
[Daniel, interview]. 
What is most interesting about these arguments is that they are remark-
ably detached from the conventional wisdom that see Ma’ale Adumim simply 
as a settlement built on occupied land in the context of a decades-long con-
flict; rather, the town represents for its residents a community that caters to 
an audience of peers, defined by their adhesion to a certain lifestyle. In this 
respect, the Palestinians represent just one of the potential disruptions of the 
quiet suburban life that the residents of Ma’ale Adumim have planned for 
themselves.
It is interesting to relate one of the unexpected results of this mental 
experiment: when asked about imaginary Palestinian neighbours, my respon-
dents often began talking about another class of difficult “others,” namely 
the ultraorthodox Jews. The haredim, as the Palestinians, are a key part of the 
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landscape of the inner city of Jerusalem (where they constitute a third of the 
city’s population) that the residents of Ma’ale Adumim have renounced for 
the comfort of suburban life. Ultraorthodox communities in Jerusalem live in 
extreme segregation that is expressed from the spatial standpoint in the exis-
tence of “haredi enclaves” such as the neighbourhood of Mea She’arim; have 
a strict understanding of religious rules regulating, say, Sabbath and women’s 
modesty; and have extremely low rates of participation to the workforce and 
to the military by virtue of generous subsidies provided by public and private 
bodies, and of special arrangements with the Israeli state. Because of this, 
haredi are almost universally despised by secular Jews. 
In Ma’ale Adumim haredi presence is limited to the small community of 
Mizpe Nevo (a neighbourhood appropriately located at the end of a dead-end 
street in the northern part of the town, which the residents close off on Satur-
day), whose members are generally described as rather nice people – meaning 
“not like the haredim in Jerusalem.” The spectre of a future haredi invasion, 
however, seems to loom in the mind of the secular residents as a disturbing sce-
nario. Indeed, I came across (unconfirmed) rumours that the mayor of Ma’ale 
Adumim has fought off the attempt by a large haredi organization to organize a 
move en masse to the town, while other residents said that they would leave the 
town should the presence of religious residents grow above a certain threshold 
[Adam, interview] or that when they move from Ma’ale Adumim it would 
be to the Tel Aviv area because of the fast growth of the haredi community in 
Jerusalem [Hannah, interview]. 
It is therefore interesting, although not entirely unexpected (also because 
the perspective of a “Palestinian takeover” of Ma’ale Adumim seems probably 
more remote than an haredi one), that the comparative judgment passed by 
most of my respondents on Palestinians and haredim was not generally favour-
able to the latter, who are seen as a concrete threat to the residents’ lifestyle. 
Hannah, Abigail’s mother and a college teacher, declared with no hesitation 
that she would have Palestinian neighbours rather than haredi: 
“Yeah [laughs]! They would probably be nicer people. I’ll tell you why: 
the haredim have an ambition, they want me to be more haredi, the Arabs 
would not do that, they don’t want to convert me, the ones that would come 
here, they would just live their life” [Hannah, interview]. 
Voicing some sort of sense of guilt for letting down her fellow Jews, but in 
an equally unequivocal way, Rachel concurs: 
“This is going to sound horrible… Let’s say that [a group of haredim] 
would come to my neighbourhood… To me it would be the same thing 
[as a group of Arabs]. It would be taking the whole identity and change it. 
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The Arab in my neighbourhood would probably not change much of it, but 
the religious Jew… would insist that I should wear a long skirt…” [Rachel, 
interview]. 
It seems that in the opinion of the secular residents of Ma’ale Adumim, 
Palestinians and haredim share some key cultural traits that distance them from 
the Israeli-Jewish mainstream; the main difference between the two groups is 
that, somehow, the haredim inevitably have a collective and political agenda 
that is advanced through their physical presence in the urban environment, 
while Palestinians can be considered simply as individuals. Rachel goes on 
noting that 
“[Arabs and haredim] are on the same level and standards: they are both 
not working; they take money from the social security and services, they both 
have lots of kids and they are both a drain on society. The haredi side, even if 
they are supposedly Jewish, they are not on our side… They throw rocks at 
us, just like the Arabs. If I drive through al-Eizariya I might get stoned, but 
if I walk through Mea She’arim [an haredi neighbourhood located northwest 
of the Old City of Jerusalem] like this [indicates her training outfit, NdA] 
I would for sure get stoned” [Rachel, interview]. 
Beyond the inherent cultural traits of the two groups and their political 
agenda (or the absence thereof), the residents’ assessment on the perspective 
of neighbourhood relations depends on the socioeconomic status of haredim 
and Palestinians. And here we can find yet another explanation of the resi-
dents’ relative preference for the latter: once again, while the Palestinian soci-
ety as a whole might share some socioeconomic traits with haredi communities, 
individual Palestinians are different. As Hannah explains, 
“Would I be against [the idea of having Arab neighbours like in French 
Hill]? No… The population that are moving to French Hill have a cer-
tain socioeconomic status, they would be doctors, lawyers, etc. It’s not the 
uneducated… That’s what I feel; the ones that are upwardly mobile would 
choose to live in these areas. The ones [who are not] would not think 
about living here, and they could not afford it in the first place” [Hannah, 
interview]. 
CONCLUSION 
The underlying argument of this article is that the success of Israel’s settle-
ment policy is due to – and reflected by – the banalization of Jewish presence 
in the West Bank. The collection of brief flashes about the experience of the 
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residents of Ma’ale Adumim sheds some light on two important features of 
this process of banalization. 
In the first place, they make clear that large part of the settlers’ population 
moved to the West Bank for very mundane reasons that had little to do with 
the tenets of Zionist ideology or grand schemes of socio-spatial engineering. 
At the same time, banal activities such as moving to the suburbs, commuting 
to work or obtaining a mortgage have not been less consequential than activ-
ists’ political campaigns in reshaping the territory of Israel/Palestine. What 
we have called “Israel/Palestine,” and the metropolitan area of Jerusalem that 
stands at its centre, is in many ways the product of the suburbanization of 
Israel’s settlement policy and of its appeal to almost all sectors and groups that 
make up the Israeli society; in turn, the suburbanization of Israel’s settlement 
policy cannot be understood without referring to larger trends and processes 
that have marked the Israeli society starting from the 1970s (such as subur-
banization, welfare retrenchment, the dynamics of the real estate market, and 
so forth). 
In the second place, as the formula of “Israel/Palestine” suggests, the 
 settlements have not provided Israel with new borders. Even “consensus 
 settlements” such as Ma’ale Adumim cannot be seen as a prototype of future 
borders – i. e. territorial artefacts that function (or will function) like the Green 
Line in the period 1949-1967. The lives of the residents of Ma’ale Adumim 
are certainly proof that the Green Line does not exist anymore; at the same 
time, however, while the Green Line functioned as a line of territorial discon-
tinuity, the settlements have created a more porous system by reshaping the 
interactions between different places and groups – once again, metropolitan 
Jerusalem being the most obvious and visible case. This transformation has 
primarily invested Israeli-Palestinian relations, although, one might suspect, 
not in the linear, straightforward way that conventional wisdom often assumes. 
This article has tried to show how the same process has had an impact on the 
Israeli-Jewish society itself, by providing a new socio-spatial context in which 
the relations between the different groups (secular and religious, low and mid-
dle-classes, Mizrahi and Askenazi, etc.) are played out. 
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